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  Abstract 
 
The function of groups as information processors is increasingly being recognised in a 
number of theories of group cognition. A theme of many of these is an emphasis on 
sharing cognition. This paper extends current conceptualisations of groups by critiquing 
the focus on shared cognition and emphasising the distribution of cognition in groups. 
In particular, it develops an account of the distribution of one cognitive construct, 
mental models. Mental models have been chosen as a focus because they are used in a 
number of theories of high level cognition from different areas of research such as 
cognitive science and human factors and so the implication of this development is wide 
reaching. This paper reviews the unconnected literatures on distributed cognition and 
mental models and integrates them in order to extend the theory of mental models to 
distributed cognitive systems such as groups. The distributed cognition literature is 
reviewed and the importance of considering the group as single cognitive system is 
adopted. A range of mental model theories are reviewed leading to the conclusion that 
they all have, in some form, the central feature of a mapping onto the cognitive system. 
Combining these two ideas, it is proposed that the model can be a mapping onto the 
whole group, if the information is distributed appropriately and the connections between 
parts of the model maintained through communication. This cognitive construct is 
referred to as a distributed mental model. Implications and applications of this theory are 
discussed and an example outlined of the use of the construct in team situation 
awareness. 
 
KEYWORDS: Distributed cognition, mental models, shared cognition. 
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Introduction 
 
Recently, several different approaches have emerged which treat the group as a unit 
of analysis for information processing in place of the traditional focus on the individual 
(e.g., Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath, 1997; Hutchins, 1995a; Larson and Christensen, 1993). 
Although there are differences between these perspectives, they are similar in that they 
consider the transmission and manipulation of information between group members to 
be part of a cognitive process1 akin as much as to any similar process within an 
individual. Accepting that the group is an information processing unit permits the events 
that occur between group members to be studied as part of the cognitive processing of a 
task rather than solely as a social phenomenon. Much high level information processing, 
especially in relation to real-world tasks, relies on cognitive representations in the form of 
mental models. In group contexts, these cognitive representations have been studied as 
‘shared mental models’. However we argue that there are many situations where mental 
models are more efficiently distributed amongst group members than shared by them. In 
practise, complex tasks more often than not require the interdependent application of 
different (e.g., specialist) knowledge and skills. Drawing on the distributed cognition 
approach (Hutchins, 1995a) in combination with the concept of mental model, we thus 
propose a ‘distributed mental model’ theory. 
Firstly, the concept of group level cognition is introduced within an information 
processing model, and what is special about group as opposed to individual level 
cognition is critically discussed. In particular the idea that shared cognition is the key 
feature of group level cognition is questioned. We argue that group information 
processing can be studied as a system by expanding the unit of analysis from individual 
to include other people and artefacts. This is the distributed cognition approach. 
                                                 
1 Cognitive processing is defined here as information processing and so these terms will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. 
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However, whilst this approach provides a framework for conceptualising cognition in 
groups it does not afford precise predictions about how information is processed in 
group contexts. To address the gap the concept of mental models is introduced, and after 
identifying the essential theoretical elements of mental model theory, a case for the role 
of ‘distributed mental models’ in high level cognition in groups is made. The implications 
of this approach are discussed along with an example and further research questions to 
illustrate its utility. 
 
Group Level Cognition  
 
The notion that a group engages in mental activity that can be analysed in its own 
right, in addition to the analysis of individuals, has a long history. The concept of a 
Group Mind was prominent in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the 
writings of McDougall, Wundt, Durkheim and Le Bon, but was used to describe how 
otherwise rational individuals could become ‘disinhibited’ and ‘irrational’  within the 
collective. Accordingly, there is still much suspicion lingering in cognitive science as to 
whether groups can operate as viable cognitive entities, and hence the individual is still 
the dominant unit of analysis in cognitive science. 
Since the late 1980’s and early 1990’s however the idea that groups can be studied as 
cognitive systems has begun to take hold in the effort to better understand group and 
team performance. Larson and Christensen (1993) for instance, introduced the term 
‘social cognition’ to refer to : 
those social processes (e.g., introducing information into a group discussion) that 
relate to the acquisition, storage, transmission, manipulation and use of 
information for the purpose of creating a group-level intellective product. 
(Larson and Christensen, 1993, p. 6) 
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Here the idea that group interactions can be cognitive processes is emphasised, 
contrasting with the more usual meaning of the term ‘social cognition’ which pertains to 
cognition about social events. Later, Hinsz et al. (1997) introduced a more detailed 
specification of information processing in groups. This approach to conceptualising 
group level cognition is to identify the components of a generic information processing 
model, divorced from whom or what processes that information. Generic processes 
include such things as attention, encoding, storage, and retrieval processes. Any activity 
that occurs within or amongst group members that fulfils one of these functions (e.g., 
through social processes) is an instance of group information processing. 
One example of how this might work uses the concept of transactive memory 
(Wegner, 1987). This group level model of memory suggests that the group is not simply 
comprised of individuals who each try and remember as much information as they can, 
the sum of which is the group memory. Rather, groups use strategies to maximise the 
memory capacity of the group. Each member of a group has specialist categories of 
information which he or she remembers and these categories are divided between group 
members through discussion. The group then shares knowledge about who knows what. 
As a result, information is efficiently stored because the person most likely to remember 
a fact does so and the redundancy in the time and effort involved in remembering is 
reduced. As a result, the information recalled by the group is often larger than that of an 
individual. The key feature of this theory is that memory performance in groups is not 
explained in terms of social influences such as social facilitation (Zajonc, 1965) or social 
loafing (Latane, Williams and Harkins, 1979). Instead, differences between individual and 
group performance are explained in terms of the efficient processing - storage, 
transmission etc. - of information by the group. 
Research on information sampling also describes how the group decision is 
influenced by sharing information with the group (e.g., Stasser and Stewart, 1992; Stasser 
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and Titus, 1985). The finding in these studies is that groups are more likely to discuss 
information that is shared by all group members. When information is not shared, it less 
likely to be used in the decision making process and this omission can bias the outcome. 
Such findings show how the processing of information at the group level, through 
communicating and acting on the facts (or by not sharing the facts) during group 
discussion, can profoundly influence the decision that the group makes. Without 
studying the group level cognitive processes these effects, which may have important 
consequences, cannot be identified or explained. 
The above research has also sought to define what group cognition is. Typically the 
fact that cognition is shared has been identified as the defining feature. For example 
Larson and Christensen state that “an individual could hardly be expected to introduce 
into a group discussion a piece of information that s/he cannot recall. And yet, simply 
recalling that information is not enough. It must also be shared with others” (p. 7). Hinsz 
et al. (1997) also claim that “At the group level, information processing involves the 
degree to which information, ideas or cognitive processes are shared, and are being 
shared, among the group members” (p. 43). Tindale and Kameda (2000) maintain that 
“the concepts “shared” and/or “sharing” are what make group information processing 
possible, and distinguish it from individual-level processing” (p. 124). However, whilst 
sharing information in groups may be important for some tasks, the idea that it is the sine 
qua non of group level cognition in groups is too restrictive. Many important information 
processing tasks in groups may depend, on the contrary, on what is ‘unshared’ cognition. 
There are in fact two meanings of shared cognition to consider. Information 
processing can be shared in the sense of transmitting information between group 
members (i.e., shared through communication) and it can also be shared in the sense that 
all group members hold the same information (i.e., shared knowledge). However there 
are several counterexamples to both of these as defining features of group cognition. 
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Transactive memory hinges on the fact that information is not always shared (i.e., not 
discussed nor held by everyone in the group). In complex tasks requiring specialist input, 
much of the information is only ever held by one person, and unless relevant, will not be 
communicated either. It is nonetheless information that is in the system somewhere, if 
required. The fact it is present enables the parallelism in the task which gives the group 
its characteristic performance. Distribution of the memory load in this instance is an 
advantage. Tindale and Kameda argue that the shared understanding of group members 
specialisms means that the cognition is at a group level, but this does not capture the key 
cause of the phenomena. All of the information, shared and unshared, is part of the 
overall cognitive process and should be considered as part of one information processing 
system. Sharing information is only one part of the information process in group 
contexts. 
When considering real world tasks it is unlikely that group members will have 
identical (shared) information. In laboratory studies of group decision making 
information consists of a small number of discrete facts which all members can readily 
appreciate. However in a real task this may not be the case. For example, an engineer and 
a designer may be discussing a car and one member of this group may mention a concept 
such as the shape of the wing mirror. For the designer this concept has meaning 
associated with aesthetics whereas for the engineer there may be meaning associated with 
aerodynamics or field of view. The basic concept is shared but the full implications of the 
meaning of the concept are quite different. It is likely that the notion of shared 
information as representations held in common by group members is not typical in 
everyday situations, in which case it is problematic to rely on shared information 
processing as a defining feature of group level cognition, either in the sense of sharing 
information or in the sense of common knowledge. 
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Instead we argue groups should be studied simply as information processing systems 
that are different to individuals but are not special in their own right.  A framework that 
adopts this stance and could readily be applied to information processing in groups is 
distributed cognition. 
 
Distributed Cognition 
 
The individual is the conventional unit of analysis for cognitive science.  Distributed 
cognition can simply be described as an approach which applies classical cognitive 
science principles, namely that cognition is information processing, to a unit of analysis 
other than the individual. Commonly the unit of analysis is larger than an individual; it 
might include the environment, artefacts in the world, social interactions and culture. 
The implication of this approach is that studying the individual alone does not present a 
full picture of the phenomenon; some effects might be omitted or misattributed to 
individuals when they are in fact properties of a larger system. It has been argued that 
this approach could demand a reappraisal of established theories if indeed they are based 
on a misattribution of cognitive processes (Hutchins, 1995a). There are two related 
theoretical implications which follow from expanding the unit of analysis for describing 
and explaining a cognitive process. Firstly, the boundary becomes larger and so other 
people and artefacts become part of the process and engage in some computation 
themselves. This may reduce the individual task load, but it adds the problem of 
communicating and coordinating with other agents in the system. In addition, the range 
of mechanisms which are thought to be involved in the cognitive process may expand to 
include other artefacts. Secondly, the nature of the computation itself may change. For 
example, solving a problem using tools may transform it such that different operations 
are required compared to solving the problem without tools. The theory outlined here 
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mostly involves the former so only this literature will be reviewed. (See Hutchins [1995a] 
for more detailed comment on the latter within distributed cognition and also Clancey, 
[1997], Greeno and Moore [1993] and Suchman [1987] for the similar concept of situated 
cognition). 
In his portrayal of distributed cognition Hutchins (1995a, 1995b) focuses mainly on 
the representations themselves. He suggests that information can be represented in 
different media, but it is clear that he considers all of these media equal in status, 
including the brain. The object of study is the propagation of representational states 
through different representational media and the process by which these media 
coordinate to allow this propagation to occur. As the representational states move 
between different media different agents perform the computation and this can influence 
what computation takes place. In principle, the representations could travel through any 
number of representational media, so there is no obvious boundary to this unit of 
analysis. The boundary can only be defined in terms of the representational media 
brought into coordination with each other thereby forming a system separate from those 
that are not. 
In an ethnographic study to illustrate this process occurring naturally, Hutchins 
(1995a) describes a bridge of a U.S. Navy ship as it approaches harbour. Navigating the 
ship through the correct channel requires expert navigation by a team and is a complex 
cognitive task. Within the distributed cognition framework this is treated as a single task.  
The procedure, much simplified, involves taking bearings on each side of the boat and 
communicating these to the navigator who plots their location on the chart. The 
information being represented is the location of the boat; this state must be propagated 
from the people who take the bearings to the chart. Initially the boat is represented as a 
physical configuration of the alidade (compass) which is converted to a number (the 
bearing). During this propagation process the representation alters in order to facilitate 
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the task. The analogue representation of the alidade is transformed into a digital 
representation which is easier for verbal communication and calculation. This is then 
communicated to the navigator who converts the number into a physical configuration 
of the hoey (protractor) and draws a line on the chart. This process is repeated for two 
other bearings so that three lines are drawn on the chart. Where they cross represents the 
location of the ship. Several representational media are used here and the propagation of 
the representational state between them is essential for computing the location of the 
boat. It is preferable to have bearings from both sides of the boat and it is essential to 
have these recorded at as nearly the same time as possible because the boat is moving. 
Thus at least two people are required, one for each side of the boat. These two bearings, 
or representations of the position of the boat, must be combined so they are propagated 
from the alidade to the navigator who combines them. So, in studying the navigation task 
the importance of the representations and where they are is essential to understanding 
how the whole system operates, along with the computations that are performed using 
the representations at each stage of the process. 
Rather than focusing on the group level per se, Hutchins focuses on the information 
processing that takes place, the representations that are used in the process, how they are 
transformed and what representational media they occur in. Thus information processing 
may occur partly within an individual as they think through a problem, partly collectively 
in a group discussion and partly with external artefacts such as a piece of technology. 
Therefore, although this approach can be used to conceptualise information processing 
in groups, it does not define group level cognition. Indeed, it strongly questions even 
individual level cognition as a useful level of analysis. 
The distributed cognition approach provides a useful framework for studying 
information processing, but it does not offer any precise predictions about how 
information processing takes place. The question of what representational media are used 
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and how remains open depending on the task that is being studied. This paper is focused 
on high level cognition and argues that this frequently relies on cognitive representations 
in the form of mental models, especially in real-world tasks. Therefore the concept of 
mental models in distributed cognitive systems will be explored. 
 
The Concept of Mental Models 
 
The concept of a mental model as a cognitive representation used in thinking has a 
long history. Craik (1943) introduced the term and it has subsequently been used as a 
fundamental concept in many theories of reasoning, such as those of Johnson-Laird 
(1983). The concept has also flourished in applied cognitive psychology and is widely 
used to explain users’ interaction with technology and physical systems within Human 
factors e.g., Gentner and Stevens (1983), Norman (1988), decision making in theories of 
Naturalistic Decision Making e.g., Klein (1993) and many other areas.  
One difficulty in using the term mental model is that there are wide differences in 
conceptualisation (e.g., Wilson and Rutherford, 1989). Moray (1999) argues that these are 
due to the range of contexts in which the construct is applied, not the construct itself. 
The context-specificity of most mental model research is illustrated by studies such as 
Kieras and Bovair (1984) in which the role of mental models in operating a simple 
machine is investigated. In this they define a mental model as “how a device works in 
terms of its internal structures and processes” (p. 255). This definition is highly specific 
to the field and so does not allow the same concept to be used in any other way apart 
from the operation of a device. In order to apply mental models to groups a more 
generally applicable theory is required. This section will review three influential theories 
of mental models in order to establish such a general theory. The theories considered 
here are developed by Craik (1943), Johnson-Laird (1983) and Moray (1999). 
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Craik (1943) is widely attributed to be the first psychologist to describe the use of 
models in reasoning. These he proposed were used in order to predict events, which he 
considered to be a fundamental property of thought. The example he gives is of building 
a bridge. This is not done haphazardly, choosing materials at random. Rather, he claims, 
a model can be constructed and tested mentally in order to ensure a sufficient safety 
factor is built in, instead of actually building a bridge and waiting to see if it collapses. 
Thus Craik is referring to a purely internal, qualitative process of modelling. He also 
offers a definition of models used in this process. Interestingly this is not a definition 
specific to mental models, it applies to all models. Hence Craik defines a model as: 
 
any physical or chemical system which has a similar relation-structure to that 
of the process it imitates.  By “relation-structure” I do not mean some 
obscure non-physical entity which attends the model, but the fact that it is a 
physical working model which works in the same way as the process it 
parallels, in the aspects under consideration at any moment. (Craik, 1943, 
p.51). 
 
It seems from this definition that the model is isomorphic (i.e., structurally identical) to 
the process it is modelling, at least in the specific aspects under consideration. However, 
later on, Craik suggests that as a model is an analogy and thus it will eventually break 
down at some point, revealing properties not found in the process it is imitating. In 
other words, the model cannot be identical to reality. Craik’s conceptualisation can 
perhaps be thought of as a rough-and-ready kind of model, constructed with pragmatic 
aims. The intention to build a detailed model is there, but the implication is that it is 
unnecessary to bother with any aspects not of direct relevance. Realistically the model 
must be expected to fall down at some level of analysis; the aim is to build a model 
which is accurate for the purposes it is to be used for. 
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In contrast, Johnson-Laird (1983) developed a more detailed and well-specified 
account of the construction and manipulation of mental models in reasoning. There are 
three reasons for the greater detail of his account. Firstly, the principles of cognitive 
science applied in the development of the theory involved the construction of several 
computational models, which lead to an emphasis on effective procedures for computing 
the models. A benefit of this is that the processes hypothesised must be fully specified in 
order for the computational model to be implemented. This means it is difficult to create 
anything but an explicit and well-specified theory. 
Secondly, Johnson-Laird lays out several principles governing the construction of 
mental models. These combine to generate mental models that are parsimonious 
representations. The principle of constructivism states that “a mental model is 
constructed from tokens arranged in a particular order to represent a state of affairs” 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 398). The principle of structural identity states that “the 
structures of mental models are identical to the structures of the states of affairs, 
whether perceived or conceived, that the models represent” (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p. 
419). All of the structural relations in the model play a symbolic role. The principle of 
economy states that “a description of a single state of affairs is represented by a single 
mental model even if the description is incomplete or indeterminate” (Johnson-Laird, 
1983, p. 408). Therefore the arrangement of the tokens in the model is isomorphic to 
one particular state of affairs that it is modelling. Unlike Craik’s theory there is no 
proviso of the model breaking down at a certain level of analysis or of only some aspects 
of the state of affairs being modelled. This means that a model is an economical and 
accurate representation of the object modelled. 
A third reason for the precision of Johnson-Laird’s theory is that he chose to study 
well defined tasks and therefore was able to collect a range of experimental data to 
establish the cognitive processes used to reason about these tasks in detail. For example, 
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an important area of his research investigated syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird 
and Bara, 1984). Syllogisms are created by combining a limited set of premises, for 
example “All artists are beekeepers. Some beekeepers are chemists. What follows?” By 
arranging all syllogistic premises in every possible combination, sixty-four different 
problems can be created and the potential number of mental models required to 
represent each of these can be calculated. For the syllogisms with valid conclusions a 
maximum of three models are required. This is a lot for the limited capacity of working 
memory to manipulate. However, it is much more reasonable to consider the exact 
models held by participants when reasoning syllogistically than in other tasks for which 
mental models are used.  
For example, nuclear power plants have in the order of forty-five degrees of freedom 
in a complex, dynamic system. To analyse this problem to the same degree of 
thoroughness would be a difficult if not impossible task (Moray, 1997). In short, 
Johnson-Laird provides a well-specified account of the use of mental models in 
reasoning. He is able to do this because of the emphasis placed on computational 
modelling of the reasoning process, the general principles established for model 
construction and the well-specified problems on which he has focused his research. 
Therefore Johnson-Laird’s position is not necessarily incompatible with the other 
theories of mental models although it may appear different as a result of these different 
emphases in its development. 
Meanwhile, Moray (1999) approaches mental models from a human factors position, 
although his aim is explicitly to unify the field. He claims that mental models are best 
defined as representations that are “homomorphic mappings” of real systems. This term 
is taken from Ashby’s (1956) work on models. Essentially, a model is a homomorphic 
mapping if it preserves the elements in a system and the relations between them to a 
certain level of abstraction. Elements are not deleted in the mapping, they are simply 
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represented more abstractly. For example, a driver may know how a car engine is related 
to other parts of the car, but may not know all of the elements within the engine. These 
have been abstracted to a single element “engine” that has the features of an engine and 
is causally linked to the wheels etc. allowing understanding of how a car functions, to a 
certain level of abstraction. This abstracted representation is a homomorphic2 mapping 
from the physical car. 
Despite both Moray’s and Johnson-Laird’s claims for universal mental model 
theories, some striking differences between them can be identified. Most obviously 
Johnson-Laird’s theory requires models to be isomorphic to the situations that they 
represent whereas Moray requires them to be homomorphic. Indeed much of their 
explanation of characteristic human behaviour follows from the chosen form of 
representation. In the case of Johnson-Laird reasoning occurs through the construction 
of one or more mental models each depicting a different situation. Where multiple 
mental models are required humans’ limited working memory capacity is taxed and 
according to Johnson-Laird this is a source of errors. But if these models were 
homomorphs, as suggested by Moray, then there would only be a single mental model 
constructed covering several situations (the many-to-one mapping) and some of the 
cognitive load would be reduced. Hence working memory capacity would not be 
exceeded and this limitation would not be a cause of error. Instead, errors would be 
caused because the mental model is only an imperfect representation. This is the 
explanation offered by Moray for errors in performance. Therefore the different forms 
of mental models explain behaviours in different ways. 
Much of these differences, it can be argued, may be largely a function of the task to 
which the mental model is applied. Moray’s example of a mental model “par excellence” 
(Moray, 1997, p. 279) is the operator of a complex system such as a process plant. This 
                                                 
2 “Homomorphism” should not be confused with “homeomorphism” which is the term used to describe 
icons by Johnson-Laird (2006, p. 435). Homeomorphisms are topological isomorphisms. 
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means the model will be repeatedly used over a long period of time and may well be 
stored in long term memory. There are many opportunities to discover if different 
models are effective through interactions with the system and it may well be that some 
homomorphisms will lead to appropriate behaviour, at least in many situations. They will 
therefore be reinforced. In contrast, deductive reasoning tasks in the laboratory will 
often only be addressed once. This does not allow much opportunity for the model to be 
stored in long term memory, nor does it allow repeated feedback to find models that will 
lead to the correct answers without using isomorphic models. It is also less likely that 
effective homomorphs exist for these problems. The form of the mental model develops 
in response to the nature of the problem it is being used for and therefore apparent 
differences arise between the forms of mental models. But this does not mean that they 
are fundamentally different. 
Thus, despite the apparent differences, there is a central idea which captures the key 
features of mental models in all of these areas. The concept common to all of the 
theories is that the mental model is a mapping of a system in the world onto the 
cognitive system. That is, a mental model is a representation of the elements of a system 
and the relationships between them in which each of these components are analogous to 
those in the system being modelled. Therefore the structure of the mental model directly 
corresponds to the structure of the real system unlike other representational forms 
where this is lost such as language or predicate calculus. The detail of this mapping may 
vary according to the domain studied. Mental models of very complex systems are likely 
to contain more abstracted elements than mental models of simpler systems and are 
therefore homomorphic mappings. Mental models of smaller, well defined domains may 
be isomorphic. But there will always be a correspondence between parts of the real 
system and the model. Thus the main function of a mental model is as an analogous 
representation of reality. 
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Different tasks may result in the mental model being used in different ways, such as 
in reasoning or decision making. Deductive reasoning may rely on the construction of 
multiple mental models whereas predictions about causal systems may rely on transitions 
from one state of the model to another. As a result, differences may arise such as the 
source of errors in thinking. However, how the mental model is used in a cognitive 
process is distinct from the nature of the representation itself. Here we have focused on 
the defining feature of the representation and this remains the same in all of these 
applications. It only remains to consider how mental models, as defined here, might 
operate in distributed cognitive systems. 
 
Distributed Mental Models: A General Theory 
 
The central idea in using the concept of mental models can now be combined with 
the framework of distributed cognition to propose the concept of “distributed mental 
model”. This concept provides a basis for understanding high level cognition in 
distributed systems, specifically cognition which relies on mental models including 
reasoning, naturalistic decision making, the cognitive basis of teamwork etc. Many of 
these applications will be in groups, but distributed cognition is not limited to groups 
and incorporates any cognitive artefacts, the environment, culture, social factors and 
other elements which might be adopted into the unit of analysis. In short, the concept of 
distributed mental models provides a basis for understanding much high level cognition 
in all of these diverse systems too.  
As was noted by Craik (1943) and Moray (1999) in particular, a model is not 
exclusively a mental construct. Models take all manner of forms, for example 
mathematical or computer based. Therefore there is no requirement for a model to be 
instantiated solely in the brain as models are not conceived fundamentally as cognitive 
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representations. They have simply been used that way. We can therefore look at the 
model as the unit of analysis in its own right and assess the information that it processes 
rather than limiting the research to only those models that are instantiated in a single 
individual. 
As is outlined above, the central feature of a mental model is that it is a 
representation of the elements of a system and the relationships between them all of 
which can be directly mapped from the system to this representation. That is, the 
elements in the representation and the relationships between them are analogous to 
those in the system being modelled, although they may be present in different levels of 
abstraction. The distributed cognition approach applied here proposes that the medium 
in which this representation exists need not be a single individual. Instead, this model 
could be mapped onto a group of people, or a group plus cognitive artefacts, and each 
person could hold part of the model. If the relations between the elements in the model 
are maintained where necessary by communication between the group members then 
this model can be treated as a single unit of analysis rather than solely studying the 
separate parts of the model that the individuals hold and therefore not the model as a 
whole. A model mapped onto a group in this way will be referred to here as a 
“distributed mental model”. 
For example, Banks, Macklin and Millward (2002) studied the causal reasoning of 
ecosystems. The full ecosystem was comprised of a number of plants and insect species 
and the predator-prey relations between them. Here, species are the elements of the 
system and the predator-prey relationships are the relationships between the elements. 
Figure 1 illustrates a typical ecosystem used in the study. A line connecting two species 
indicates a predator-prey relationship. 
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Insert figure 1 about here 
 
In this experiment, predictions about changes in the population levels within the 
ecosystem were generated by groups. Groups in which all of the group members were 
given the entire ecosystem were compared with groups where this model of the 
ecosystem was distributed between them. Examples of the distributed representations 
held by two group members are presented in figures 2 and 3. One group member was 
given figure two and the other figure three. 
 
 
Insert figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
The entire model of the ecosystem is known by the group, but it is distributed 
between them. One person knows the details of the left hand side but only the very 
abstract element of the ecosystem “other bugs” for the right hand side and vice versa. To 
generate predictions about changes in the population levels of the species participants 
imagined the consequences of an increase or decrease in prey or predator for each 
species in turn. For example, an increase in plants will lead to an increase of food for 
Liddenbugs which will lead to an increase in that species, leading to an increase in food 
for Tasselbugs and Bitterbugs etc. This study showed that groups were able to distribute 
effectively the cognition required for this task. Where predictions about species involved 
parts of the model held only by that group member they generated these independently, 
in parallel. However when the predictions were influenced by species known about by 
both group members, they discussed this impact together. Thus the model was 
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distributed between group members but when relations between elements occurred 
between people, these were maintained by communication. The whole model was used 
to generate predictions, but the cognitive process was partially completed by individuals 
and partly collaboratively according to the mapping of the model onto the group. 
The ecosystem example demonstrates one way in which information can be 
distributed in a group and in this case the predictions were more accurate with the 
distributed mental model than when the model was shared by both group members. 
However there are many ways in which the model could have been distributed and 
different distributions will have different implications for the cognitive process. 
One important feature of the distribution is the division of the model between 
people. For example, Banks and Millward (2000) describe how models can be 
decomposed into relatively independent components, referred to as “modules” by 
Chandrasekaran (1981). The modules are subsystems which have a relatively high 
number of intra-connections, but a relatively low number of interconnections. This 
means that group members who hold parts of the model which are whole modules will 
be able to complete some reasoning independently as modules are relatively autonomous, 
by definition. As a result different group members can be engaged in reasoning in 
parallel, simultaneously forming inferences about different parts of the model. These can 
then be combined at a later point. In contrast, if the module was divided such that group 
members held only parts of modules then individuals could not engage in much 
independent reasoning and would be required to discuss much more.   
For example, in Banks et al. (2002) the species Gatterbugs, Tasselbugs, Liddenbugs 
and Bitterbugs form a module. There are complex relations between them but 
comparatively simple inputs and outputs. This arrangement is what enabled the group 
members to reason in parallel about much of the impact of population change, only 
combining to discuss the shared species, the plants and Badgerbugs. A benefit of this is 
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that communication is time consuming and cognitively demanding and so the whole 
process can be quicker. The parallelism allows different modules to be attended to at the 
same time by different group members which will also be efficient. A disadvantage is that 
there are reduced opportunities to check what other group members are thinking and 
detect potential errors. Conversely, if many elements in the model or relationships 
between them are split between group members, these will all need to be discussed in 
order to ensure that these links in the distributed cognitive process are maintained. As a 
result the process will be slower and potentially prone to error because of the cognitive 
demands of this discussion. However this discussion could prove a valuable check of 
group members’ thinking, depending on the context and model. 
A second important element influencing the distributed cognitive process is the 
timing of the process. Given a modular distribution of the mental model, group 
members will work in parallel and explicitly discuss only parts of the model. However it 
is important for effective thinking that when they do discuss the model they do so in a 
coordinated fashion. This theory proposes that the key feature of these discussions is to 
maintain the links between elements of the model when split between people and so 
allow the information to be processed accurately even when the model is distributed. 
However the cognitive process develops over time. For the discussions to maintain links 
in the model accurately it is important that group members are talking about the same 
thing. For example, in Banks et al. predictions were made by considering the impact of 
population change in one species on another over a certain time period. For accurate 
discussion group members must be talking about the same time periods in order for their 
parallel predictions to be compatible. 
A third important feature to which can influence a distributed mental model is the 
filtering of the information processed. For example, the hidden profiles identified by 
Stasser occurred because information relevant to problem was not perceived as relevant 
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when in fact it was and so was not shared. Individuals filtered the information presented 
to the group on the basis of their understanding of the problem and so inadvertently 
biased the outcome of the decision. There is potential for this to occur in groups with 
incompletely distributed mental models. If the distribution is complete two aspects of the 
model are relevant. Where the model is split between individuals all the relevant links in 
the model are maintained through communication and so no filtering takes place. Where 
an individual holds a self-contained module that comprises part of the overall model 
there is no need for the details of this model to be shared, only the inputs and outputs 
are relevant, and so no filtering takes place. However the problem can arise with an 
incompletely distributed model. If the links between parts of model that are split between 
people are not maintained, then group members will make choices about what 
information to communicate and some relevant information will be lost. These losses 
will affect the accuracy of the cognitive processing and so systematic choices about what 
not to discuss is a filtering of information that could lead to biases.  Similarly, the model 
may be distributed inaccurately such that group members are not aware of certain links 
between elements of the model. They may believe they are working on a module 
independently and reason on this basis and therefore omit important information from 
other elements of the model because they did not know that it was relevant. An accurate 
distribution of the model will not lead to filtering of information, but imperfect 
distributions may well do so. 
A final factor influencing how the distributed mental model may be used is the 
cognitive architecture onto which the model is mapped. A formal definition of a 
cognitive architectures suggests that it “includes the basic operations provided by the 
biological substrate, say, for storing and retrieving symbols, comparing them, treating 
them differently” (Pylyshyn, 1984, p. 30). In other words, a cognitive process takes place 
in a physical system, normally considered to be a person although here we have extended 
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that unit to wider systems. This physical system provides some constraints and limits on 
what is possible. There are limits of speed, cognitive capacity etc. which constrain the 
information processing in various ways. These limits will affect the distribution of the 
mental model. 
In his approach to distributed cognition, Hutchins does not discuss the influence of 
the limits of these basic operations on the cognitive process. In fact, a result of his move 
towards any unit of analysis that is processing information is that he does not consider 
the differences between cognitive agents in a distributed cognitive system. They are all 
considered equally. In doing this Hutchins is adopting a classic information processing 
approach to cognition in which the process is outlined without consideration for the 
architectural constraints that might exist, such as biological plausibility. However, whilst 
it is useful to treat all information processing agents as part of the cognitive process they 
all have different information processing capabilities and this will impact on 
performance. A group member who is able to write notes (and so distributes memory 
between herself and the paper) will be able to use this information to support recall, for 
example, and so perform differently to a group member without. Therefore it is not just 
the way the model is distributed that matters, it is also important to consider the different 
cognitive architectures onto which it is mapped. For example, an efficient distribution of 
the ecosystem in Figure 1 was to divide the model into two modules which were split 
between the two group members and so allowed the processing of these to occur in 
parallel. This was in part effective because the cognitive workload involved in forming 
predictions for each module was compatible with the capacity of the group members and 
the natural division of the model into two halves fitted the number of people engaged in 
this task. So here was a good mapping between the distribution of the model and the 
cognitive architecture (i.e., the group). If the same model had been mapped onto a group 
of three people there would not have been as efficient a distribution as the model cannot 
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as easily be divided into three. Therefore the cognitive architecture of a group of three is 
not well aligned with the layout of this model. Or, if the model had been more complex 
with more details in each of the components then it might be possible to distribute 
between two people but the cognitive demands of the task would be too difficult for one 
individual to work on the module allocated. As a result the group would be likely to 
collaborate on the whole problem rather than working efficiently in parallel. When 
considering the impact of the distribution of the mental model onto a distributed 
cognitive system such as a group it is not just the division of information that affects the 
information processing but rather then compatibility between the distribution and the 
cognitive architecture onto which it is mapped. 
Finally, we argue here that the concept of mental models is used to explain high level 
cognition in a number of different areas. Therefore any of these areas could be extended 
to include groups and other distributed systems by applying the concept of distributed 
mental models. An example will be briefly discussed here in order to illustrate this. 
Distributed mental models will be used to extend the concept of “situation awareness” to 
distributed teams. 
Situation awareness is commonly defined as “the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endlsey, 1995, p. 37). The cognitive 
constructs used in to develop situation awareness in teams is a matter of debate. Endsley 
(1995) equates situation awareness with the situation model, that is a model of the 
current state of a system. Based on the discussion of mental models above, the situation 
model is compatible with the definition of a mental model used here, although the word 
“situation” emphasises it is a model of the current state not and is not stored in long 
term memory.  
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When studying situation awareness in teams, the team situation model has been 
described as the collective situation model (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers and Stout, 
2000) or the shared situation model (Cooke, Stout and Salas, 2001). Thus this definition 
is open to the criticisms of cognition in groups as shared cognition which are outlined 
above. Applying the previous arguments to this case, an understanding of distributed 
situation models is necessary to explain cognition in these teams. Some work begins to 
consider this need, for example Stanton, Stewart, Harris, Houghton, Baber, McMaster, 
Salmon, Hoyle, Walker, Young, Linsell, Dymott and Green (2006) but whilst this paper 
describes a method of graphically presenting the knowledge it stops short of detailing the 
cognitive constructs involved in distributed situation awareness. 
The theory of distributed mental models can readily be applied to fill this gap. If 
situation awareness is equated with situation models in individuals, then the same 
argument applies to teams and other distributed systems. A situation model can be 
formed of a system and this can be mapped onto the team in a distributed way. That is, 
some team members may hold some areas of the model and others different areas, but as 
long as the links between these parts of the model are maintained and joined in a single 
information processing system then this distributed model of the situation is complete, 
even if it is not held fully by all team members. The issues discussed above about how 
the model can be effectively distributed into modules will influence how accurate the 
situation awareness is. Also, it is important that the model is mapped so that team 
members are aware of the parts of the model that they need for their task. Other factors 
will influence the effectiveness of the distributed mental model based on the context in 
which it is used. But the key point is that the concept of a distributed mental model can 
be applied to offer a more precise account of the cognitive constructs used by groups 
and in distributed situations than many existing ideas that emphasise only the sharing of 
knowledge. 
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The concept of distributed mental models also provides a rich source of further 
research questions. For example: 
1. What factors determine the extent to which groups distribute rather than share 
cognition? 
2. In what situations are distributed mental models more efficient than shared mental 
models and vice versa? 
3. Are mental models of some types of information more likely to be distributed than 
other information? For example are mental models of a task distributed more 
commonly than mental models of a team? 
4. We claim that an efficient distribution of a mental model within a group will occur 
when the mental model can be decomposed into relatively discrete modules which 
are then distributed amongst the group. Is this always true? If so, what makes an 
effective module? 
5. When mental models are distributed, we claim that each group member will retain 
simplified, abstract knowledge of the information held by group members in order to 
allow a connection between the otherwise distinct modules. Is this always true? What 
factors influence the level of abstraction? What is the optimal level of abstraction? 
6. How do social factors influence the manipulation of a distributed mental model? For 
example social influences (such as group cohesion) can influence communication. 
7. How do the limits of individual cognition constrain the processing and interaction of 
group members and therefore constrain the effectiveness of information processing 
of the distributed mental model? 
8. How do these limits influence the different ways of distributing the mental model 
between people? 
We believe that work to answer these questions will aid the understanding of cognition in 
groups, in particular high level cognition of groups and teams engaged in complex, real 
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world tasks. The distributed mental model concept can help inform this work by offering 
a specific account of the cognitive representations used by groups in distributed 
situations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper argues that distributed mental models are an important construct which 
adds to the explanation of much high level cognition in groups and teams. Many groups, 
especially in real world contexts, do not share knowledge. They may have distinct roles or 
expertise which means they cannot fully share an understanding of the task. Indeed, 
often the purpose of a team is to bring together different perspectives. As a result, 
previous approaches to understanding cognition in teams that focus exclusively on 
sharing cognition are inappropriate and a greater emphasis on distributing cognition 
allows a more accurate description of what groups and teams actually do. However, it is 
necessary to go beyond the general claim that cognitive processes are distributed. A 
theory of what is distributed enables specific accounts of cognition in groups to be 
developed. This paper has focused on mental models as these are a theoretical construct 
which are a widely used to explain high level cognition such as reasoning and decision 
making. The central idea of a mental model as a mapping from the real system to the 
cognitive system is readily applied to distributed cognitive systems such as groups. This 
notion of a distributed mental model greatly adds to conceptualisations of groups as 
information processors through emphasising the importance of how a model is 
distributed, e.g., into relatively independent modules or the compatibility between the 
distribution of the model and the properties of the cognitive architecture of the 
distributed cognitive system. The approach can be applied to a number of theories of 
group cognition and will help develop accounts of the ways in which models are 
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distributed between group members and therefore help explain how groups process 
information. 
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Figure 1: Typical ecosystem studied by Banks, Macklin and Millward (2002) 
 
Badgerbugs 
Gatterbugs Fettlebugs 
Bitterbugs Teenybugs 
Liddenbugs Simmerbug
s 
Plants 
Tasselbugs 
Oojoobugs 
Distributed Mental Models 
 
 35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Partial representation of an ecosystem 
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Figure 3: Partial representation of an ecosystem 
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